POSITION PAPER

The Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026

A Call for Reconsideration

An Analysis of the Bill, Its Economic and Constitutional Risks, and a Proposal for a Better, Evidence-Based Regulatory Framework

This paper urges the Government of Uganda to withdraw the Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 in its current form and to replace it with a narrowly tailored, transparency-based framework modelled on successful reforms in peer jurisdictions. The present Bill is constitutionally fragile, economically self-defeating, and diplomatically isolating. A better path exists and is already working in neighbouring countries.

Written and prepared by

Sigmund M. Rugimbi

Legal Theorist and Constitutional Policy Analyst

*Submitted for the consideration of the Cabinet,
Parliament of Uganda, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs*

Executive Summary

The Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 (Bill No. 13) is presented as a measure to defend Uganda's self-determination. On close reading of its thirty clauses, however, the Bill does something very different. It creates a sweeping licensing regime under which millions of ordinary Ugandans, their families abroad, local NGOs, churches, mosques, law firms, banks, and development partners may be classified as "agents of foreigners," required to register with a security department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and subjected to criminal penalties of up to twenty years in prison and fines reaching four billion Uganda Shillings for corporations.

This position paper makes four central arguments:

- **First,** the Bill is constitutionally unsound. It redefines citizens lawfully residing abroad as "foreigners," in direct tension with Articles 1, 9, and 12 of the 1995 Constitution, and delegates to a single Minister powers of registration, refusal, suspension, inspection, and financial approval that properly belong to Parliament and the Judiciary.
- **Second,** the Bill is economically self-defeating. Diaspora remittances reached USD 2.5 billion in 2025, roughly 3.8 percent of GDP, and more than sixteen million individual transactions, overwhelmingly under USD 500, funded school fees, medical bills, construction, and small enterprise. Imposing ministerial pre-approval on transfers above UGX 400,000,000 and criminalising unregistered receipt threatens this lifeline and the Foreign Direct Investment Uganda needs to reach middle-income status by 2030.
- **Third,** the Bill is redundant. Uganda already has the Anti-Money Laundering Act (Cap. 118), the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Penal Code, the Financial Intelligence Authority, the NGO Act, and the Public Finance Management Act (Cap. 171). Genuine concerns about illicit finance, foreign interference in elections, or opaque civil-society funding can be addressed through these instruments, strengthened where necessary.
- **Fourth,** the Bill follows the wrong international model. It imports the structure of Russia's 2012 foreign-agents law and its imitators in Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia, frameworks that have triggered EU accession freezes, capital flight, and diplomatic sanctions. The better models, the United States' FARA, Kenya's Public Benefit Organisations Act, and the EU's transparency directives, prioritise disclosure over prohibition, due process over executive discretion, and narrow definitions over sweeping criminalisation.

We respectfully propose, in Part V of this paper, a Ugandan Transparency and Accountability Framework that achieves every legitimate objective the Bill claims to pursue, protecting elections, deterring illicit finance, and ensuring Government retains primacy over policy, without

criminalising the diaspora, strangling civil society, or signalling to global investors that Uganda is "closed for business."

Part I: What the Bill Actually Does

Public commentary on the Bill has often focused on its title. The text is more consequential. A clause-by-clause reading reveals six structural features that, taken together, transform a claimed "transparency" law into a comprehensive licensing-and-permission regime over cross-border economic, civic, and political life.

1.1 A Sweeping Definition of "Foreigner" and "Agent"

Clause 1 defines a "foreigner" to include not only non-citizens and foreign entities but also "a Ugandan citizen residing outside Uganda." The same clause defines an "agent of a foreigner" as any person who acts "at the order, request, or under the direction or control of a foreigner," or "any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidised by a foreigner."

Read together, these two definitions mean that a mother in Kabale receiving school fees from her daughter in Birmingham is an "agent" acting for a "foreigner." A Ugandan church supported by a partner congregation in Dallas is an agent. A law firm retained by a Nairobi-based client is an agent. A software consultant paid by a European company through Stripe is an agent. The definitions do not distinguish between political activity and ordinary commercial, familial, or charitable life.

> *Under clause 1, approximately one million Ugandans resident abroad become "foreigners" by operation of law, and every relative, business associate, lawyer, accountant, or pastor who receives value from them becomes, presumptively, an "agent."*

1.2 A Mandatory Licensing Regime (Clauses 14–20)

No person may "act as an agent of a foreigner" without first applying to the Minister of Internal Affairs, submitting to due-diligence inquiries by the security Department (clause 16), and receiving a certificate of registration valid for only two years (clause 17). The Minister may refuse registration (clause 18), impose conditions, and suspend or revoke the certificate (clause 20) on broad grounds including that the holder "is no longer a fit and proper person" or that their activities "pose a security threat." Operating without registration carries a fine up to 50,000 currency points (UGX 1,000,000,000) or ten years' imprisonment.

1.3 Ministerial Pre-Approval of Foreign Funds (Clause 22)

Clause 22 prohibits any person or agent from receiving, directly or indirectly, financial support from a foreigner "in excess of twenty thousand currency points, within a period of twelve months without the written approval of the Minister." At UGX 20,000 per currency point (Schedule), this threshold is UGX 400,000,000 per year, roughly USD 105,000. For a growing small business, a mid-sized NGO, a diocese, a university research grant, or a family purchasing a house with diaspora contributions, this ceiling is ordinary, not exceptional. Every such inflow must now pass through the Minister's office.

1.4 Banks as Gatekeepers, with Civil Penalties (Clause 25)

Every "supervised institution", meaning every licensed bank, money-transfer operator, and mobile-money provider, is barred from paying out to an agent of a foreigner without first obtaining (a) a source-of-funds declaration and (b) proof of the Minister's written authorisation. Non-compliance exposes the institution to a civil penalty of UGX 4,000,000,000 per incident. In practice, banks facing this exposure will refuse to process any transaction they cannot clear, forcing even lawful transfers through costly bureaucratic pre-clearance.

1.5 Broad, Vague New Offences (Clauses 5–13)

Part II criminalises a set of conducts defined so broadly that they foreseeably capture protected civic activity:

- **Clause 5:** "promoting the interests of a foreigner against the interests of Uganda", undefined and unqualified.
- **Clause 8(3):** prohibiting any person or agent from "hindering, frustrating or disrupting" Government policy implementation, language which, on its face, could reach ordinary public criticism, legal challenges, or advocacy.
- **Clause 13:** "economic sabotage," defined to include publishing information that "weakens or damages the economic system or viability of the country." A negative credit rating, a critical editorial, or a published academic study of inflation could all be argued to fall within the clause.
- **Clause 1's definition of "disruptive activities"** includes "engaging or participating in a riot or unlawful demonstration or assembly" and "disrupting or interfering with the lawful activities, business operations, peace or human rights of any person", capturing ordinary protest and industrial action.

1.6 Penalties Disproportionate to Ordinary Conduct

The principal penalty recurring throughout Part II is a fine up to 200,000 currency points (UGX 4,000,000,000) for legal entities, and 100,000 currency points (UGX 2,000,000,000) or twenty years' imprisonment or both for individuals. The same maximum applies to promoting foreign

policy (clause 10), interfering with operations of Government (clause 12), and economic sabotage (clause 13). Twenty years is the statutory maximum for aggravated robbery and rape in Uganda. That the Bill punishes speech offences and policy advocacy at the same level is, by itself, an indicator of disproportion.

> *In sum: the Bill does not merely create a disclosure regime. It creates a permission regime over remittances, foreign grants, civil-society funding, and policy advocacy, backed by criminal sanctions at the upper end of Ugandan law. That is a categorical change, not a calibrated reform.*

Part II: Why the Bill Is the Wrong Instrument

2.1 Constitutional Infirmity

The 1995 Constitution, in Article 1, vests sovereignty in the people of Uganda. Article 9 recognises every person born in Uganda or to a Ugandan parent as a citizen. Article 12 provides for dual citizenship. The Constitution does not cease to protect Ugandans when they cross the border. Yet clause 1 of the Bill reclassifies "a Ugandan citizen residing outside Uganda" as a "foreigner." This is not a definition, it is a redefinition of citizenship by ordinary statute, which Article 259 reserves for constitutional amendment.

The Bill further engages Articles 29 (freedom of expression, association, and assembly), 40 (right to work and to practise one's profession), and 26 (protection from deprivation of property). Ministerial power to refuse, suspend, or revoke a registration, and to freeze the receipt of one's own money, without a judicial hearing, and on grounds as vague as "not a fit and proper person," is difficult to reconcile with the due-process guarantees Uganda has repeatedly affirmed before its own courts and before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

2.2 It Is Redundant: Uganda Already Has the Tools

The Government's own memorandum to the Bill identifies three mischiefs: interference with policy by foreign-funded actors, donor conditions conflicting with Government programmes, and online misinformation. Each is already addressed in existing Ugandan law:

Concern	Existing Legal Instrument
Illicit financial flows	Anti-Money Laundering Act (Cap. 118); Financial Intelligence Authority reporting obligations; Bank of Uganda Foreign Exchange Act.
Terrorism financing	Anti-Terrorism Act; UN sanctions regime incorporation; FIA suspicious-transaction reporting.
Electoral interference	Presidential Elections Act; Parliamentary Elections Act; Political Parties and Organisations Act (foreign funding restrictions already exist).
NGO accountability	Non-Governmental Organisations Act, 2016 and Regulations; NGO Bureau registration, reporting, and permit system.
Foreign aid to Government	Public Finance Management Act (Cap. 171); Budget Act.

Concern	Existing Legal Instrument
Online misinformation	Computer Misuse Act; Data Protection and Privacy Act; Uganda Communications Act.
Espionage and sedition	Penal Code Act (Chapter XII); Official Secrets Act.

If any of these statutes is under-enforced or inadequate, the appropriate remedy is targeted amendment, properly resourced enforcement, and inter-agency coordination, not the creation of a parallel, security-led regime duplicating their functions.

2.3 It Is Economically Self-Defeating

The Remittance Lifeline

According to the Bank of Uganda's June 2025 data, remittance inflows reached **USD 2.5 billion in 2025, approximately 3.8 percent of GDP**. Over sixteen million transactions were recorded that year, with an average transaction size of USD 152. More than 93 percent of transfers were under USD 499, money used for food, school fees, medical bills, and small-scale construction. The United States was the largest source (USD 702 million), followed by Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the UAE, and Canada.

A regime that requires every recipient of funds from a "foreigner" (including their own children abroad) to register, and that conditions transfers above UGX 400 million on ministerial approval, will have three predictable effects. First, it will push a significant share of the USD 2.5 billion into informal, untraceable channels, hawala, courier cash, cryptocurrency, precisely the opposite of what sound AML policy requires. Second, it will raise the cost of remittance further above the already-high 8–10 percent fees charged on Uganda corridors (SDG 10.c.1 targets 3 percent). Third, it will erode diaspora trust, at a moment when the Bank of Uganda itself projects remittances growing to UGX 7 trillion by 2030.

Foreign Direct Investment and the Middle-Income Target

Uganda's Vision 2040 and NDP III are predicated on attracting capital. Ministerial pre-approval for inbound transfers above UGX 400 million will be read by international investors as capital controls. In practice, major law firms, fund administrators, and compliance officers in London, New York, Dubai, Nairobi, and Johannesburg assign higher country-risk premiums, and often decline to serve, jurisdictions with discretionary licensing regimes over inbound funds. The Bill would effectively re-price Uganda's cost of capital upward at precisely the moment oil revenue must be leveraged into diversified investment.

Regional Competitiveness

Uganda is part of the East African Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the African Continental Free Trade Area. Kenya and Rwanda have taken the opposite approach: Kenya operationalised its Public Benefit Organisations Act in May 2024, replacing the restrictive NGO Coordination Act with a transparency-based framework, and is actively competing for diaspora capital through diaspora bonds and investment conventions. Rwanda has been ranked among the continent's top destinations for ease of doing business for more than a decade. A Uganda that sends the opposite signal will not merely lag, it will lose actual investment decisions already in pipeline.

2.4 It Follows the Wrong International Model

The Bill's proponents suggest it benchmarks against Western transparency laws. It does not. A close comparison shows the opposite.

a. What the US FARA actually does

The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. §611 et seq.) is a *disclosure* statute, not a licensing or permission statute. It does not prohibit any activity; it requires those engaged in political activity on behalf of a foreign principal to register and publicly disclose their relationship and finances. Criminal penalties attach only to *willful* violations, not mere failure to register, and are capped at USD 250,000 and five years' imprisonment. FARA contains explicit exemptions for commercial activity, academic exchange, religious activity, and humanitarian work. Enforcement is by the Department of Justice, subject to full judicial review.

b. What happened in Georgia

Georgia adopted a foreign-agents law in May 2024, compelling registration of NGOs and media receiving more than 20 percent of their income from abroad. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe issued an urgent opinion finding the law incompatible with freedom of association, expression, privacy, and non-discrimination. The European Union froze Georgia's accession process in June 2024; Germany and France suspended bilateral aid; the EU and US imposed sanctions on officials. In June 2025 Georgia expanded the regime with criminal penalties. The lesson is direct: adopting a Russia-style "foreign agent" label produces immediate reputational and financial consequences even in a country with candidate-country EU status.

c. What Kenya did instead

Kenya's Public Benefit Organisations Act, enacted in 2013 and operationalised in May 2024, provides an enabling framework with mandatory transparency: clear registration criteria, a statutory 60-day decision deadline, an independent Public Benefit Organisations Regulatory Authority, a dedicated Disputes Tribunal for appeals, public access to filings, and tax incentives for compliant organisations. It applies the same standards to domestic and international

organisations, curbs arbitrary decision-making, and explicitly "safeguards freedom of association." Kenya's approach has been endorsed by the African Union, the UN, and major development partners, the opposite reception of Georgia's law.

d. What Uganda's draft resembles

The Bill's structure, broad definitions, mandatory registration with the security organ, ministerial pre-approval of funds, vague criminal offences, and harsh penalties, more closely tracks the 2012 Russian Federal Law on Foreign Agents and its imitators (Hungary's 2017 law, struck down by the Court of Justice of the EU; Nicaragua's 2020 Law; Kyrgyzstan's 2024 Law; Ethiopia's now-repealed 2009 Charities Proclamation) than any Western transparency statute. These are the wrong peers.

> *Every legitimate transparency objective in the Bill can be achieved by the FARA/Kenya PBO model. Every illegitimate effect of the Bill, capital flight, diplomatic isolation, criminalisation of ordinary civic life, is uniquely produced by the Russian/Georgian model the Bill has adopted.*

Part III: Who Bears the Cost

The Bill's burden does not fall on abstract "foreign agents." It falls on identifiable Ugandans:

The Diaspora and Their Families

Over one million Ugandans abroad, students, health workers in the UK and North America, domestic and construction workers in the Gulf, refugees, dual citizens, are reclassified as "foreigners." Each of their relatives becomes presumptively an "agent." The school-fee transfer, the funeral contribution, the hospital-bill payment, every one of them becomes a regulated transaction.

Churches, Mosques, and Temples

Faith-based institutions in Uganda operate hospitals, schools, orphanages, and clinics largely through international partnerships. The Catholic Church, the Anglican Church of Uganda, the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, Pentecostal networks, and Hindu and Sikh communities all receive cross-border support. The Bill places every such partnership under the registration regime and the UGX 400 million ceiling.

Health and Education Partners

Makerere University, Mulago Hospital, the Infectious Diseases Institute, TASO, and scores of teaching hospitals and research centres operate on foreign grants. The clause 22 ceiling is easily exceeded by a single research project.

Small Business and the Digital Economy

The Ugandan freelancer paid by a European tech company through Upwork, the Kampala start-up raising seed capital from a Nairobi or Cape Town fund, the coffee cooperative receiving pre-financing from a European roaster, each becomes an "agent" requiring registration.

The Banking and Mobile-Money Sector

Uganda's mobile-money ecosystem, a continental success story, processes millions of small cross-border transactions daily. Requiring banks and MTN/Airtel Money to verify source-of-funds declarations and ministerial approvals on each transaction imposes compliance costs that will be passed through as fees, or force outright refusal of transactions.

Independent Media and Civil Society

Investigative journalism, human-rights monitoring, legal aid to indigent clients, election observation, and academic research on governance all depend in part on international funding. Labelling these organisations "agents of foreigners" stigmatises their work and exposes them to

vague offences such as "economic sabotage" (clause 13) or "interfering with Government operations" (clause 12).

Part IV: The Legitimate Concerns the Bill Attempts to Address

In the spirit of constructive engagement, this paper does not dismiss the Government's stated concerns. There are genuine issues the Bill's memorandum identifies, and a serious legislative response is warranted to each:

4.1 Covert Foreign Political Influence

It is legitimate for a state to know when a domestic actor is lobbying for a foreign government or political party. Transparency, not prohibition, is the right instrument, and the one all mature democracies use.

4.2 Illicit and Unreported Financial Flows

Uganda has FATF and ESAAMLG obligations to detect money laundering and terrorism financing. The existing FIA architecture is the proper forum for this. What is needed is better resourcing and inter-agency data-sharing, not a duplicative ministerial approval regime.

4.3 NGOs Operating Outside National Priorities

Where donor-funded programmes genuinely duplicate or undermine Government service delivery, the appropriate response is coordination mechanisms (as the Development Cooperation Policy already provides) and, where necessary, stronger reporting under the existing NGO Act, not blanket criminalisation of foreign funding.

4.4 Foreign Interference in Elections

Uganda already prohibits foreign funding of political parties under the Political Parties and Organisations Act. That prohibition can be strengthened, with enhanced transparency obligations on campaign finance and digital political advertising, a far more effective measure than a general foreign-agent regime.

4.5 Online Misinformation

Disinformation is a genuine and cross-border challenge, but its regulation should sit in a focused, speech-protective framework developed with the Uganda Communications Commission, civil society, and the private sector, not in a security-organ-led licensing regime that risks capturing legitimate journalism and academic debate.

Part V: A Better Way: A Ugandan Transparency and Accountability Framework

We propose the withdrawal of the Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 and its replacement with a narrowly tailored reform package built on four proven pillars, each drawn from jurisdictions whose frameworks have been tested and endorsed internationally.

Pillar 1: Targeted Disclosure, Not Licensing

Following the model of the US Foreign Agents Registration Act, disclosure obligations should attach only to:

- Persons engaged in political or policy-influencing activity in Uganda on behalf of a foreign government, foreign political party, or foreign state-owned enterprise; and
- Persons paid to lobby Ugandan officials or to shape public opinion on specific government decisions at the direction of such principals.

Disclosure should be filed with an independent Transparency Registrar (modelled on Kenya's PBO Regulatory Authority or the UK's Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists), not with a security department. Filings should be public. Ordinary remittances, commercial transactions, academic exchange, religious mission work, humanitarian assistance, and medical treatment must be expressly exempted, as they are under FARA §613.

Pillar 2: Strengthen AML/CFT Rather than Duplicate It

Every legitimate objective regarding illicit finance is already within the mandate of the Financial Intelligence Authority and the Bank of Uganda under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. We propose:

- Enhanced FIA resourcing and inter-agency data-sharing with URA, BoU, and law enforcement;
- A risk-based approach to high-value inbound transfers aligned with FATF Recommendation 16, using existing reporting thresholds and suspicious-transaction reports rather than a new ministerial approval step;
- Preservation of low-value remittance corridors, with active policy support to drive transaction costs toward the UN SDG 10.c.1 target of 3 percent.

Pillar 3: A Kenya-Style PBO Framework for Civil Society

We recommend that the existing NGO Act, 2016 be amended to incorporate the best features of the Kenyan PBO Act:

- A statutory 60-day decision deadline on registration applications, with deemed registration on expiry;
- Clear, published criteria for registration and revocation, eliminating "national interest" style open-textured tests;
- An independent regulator with a mixed-composition board (government, sector, and professional representation);
- A dedicated Disputes Tribunal with judicial review, as Kenya provides, not ministerial-only discretion;
- Public register of filings, annual financial returns, and beneficial-ownership disclosure;
- Tax incentives for compliant organisations, aligning regulatory compliance with operational benefit.

Pillar 4: Active Diaspora Engagement, Not Criminalisation

Uganda's diaspora is an asset, not a risk. We recommend:

- Operationalisation of the National Diaspora Policy, with adequately resourced Diaspora Services at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- Launch of a Uganda Diaspora Bond, following the Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Indian precedents, to channel remittance-adjacent savings into infrastructure;
- Recognition and strengthening of dual citizenship protections under Article 12, with streamlined consular services;
- A formal Diaspora Advisory Council to Cabinet, mirroring India's Pravasi Bharatiya Divas and Rwanda's Diaspora General Directorate;
- Partnership with supervised institutions to drive remittance costs down, expand digital corridors, and enable diaspora investment in SMEs.

Summary Comparison

Feature	Bill, 2026 (Current)	Proposed Framework
Regulatory instrument	Mandatory licensing by security organ	Disclosure to independent Transparency Registrar
Who must register	Anyone receiving foreign funds or "supervised" by a foreigner, including the diaspora	Only paid political lobbyists acting for a foreign principal
Threshold for ministerial approval	UGX 400 million per year (clause 22)	No pre-approval; risk-based reporting via FIA

Feature	Bill, 2026 (Current)	Proposed Framework
Diaspora	Reclassified as "foreigners"	Full citizens; dual citizenship strengthened
Definition of key offences	Vague ("interests of a foreigner," "economic sabotage")	Narrow, intent-based, aligned with existing Penal Code
Maximum penalty (individual)	UGX 2 billion / 20 years	Calibrated to offence; aligned with proportionality
Due process	Ministerial discretion; limited judicial recourse	Independent tribunal; full judicial review
Banks and mobile money	Pre-clearance gatekeepers, 4B UGX civil penalty	Existing FIA reporting; risk-based monitoring
International standing	Russia / Georgia / Hungary model	US FARA / Kenya PBO model
Effect on remittances	Chill and driven informal	Protected and formalised

Part VI: Specific Recommendations

We respectfully recommend that:

i. Withdrawal and Redrafting

The Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026 be withdrawn from the Order Paper of Parliament in its present form.

ii. Broad Consultation

A multi-stakeholder drafting process be convened under the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, including the Uganda Law Reform Commission, the Uganda Law Society, Parliament's Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee, the Bank of Uganda, the Financial Intelligence Authority, the NGO Bureau, the Private Sector Foundation Uganda, the Uganda Manufacturers Association, faith-based councils, diaspora representative bodies, and the development partner community.

iii. Constitutional Review

The Attorney General be invited to issue a formal opinion on the compatibility of any draft with Articles 1, 9, 12, 26, 29, and 40 of the Constitution, and with Uganda's obligations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

iv. Economic Impact Assessment

Bank of Uganda, the Ministry of Finance, and the Uganda Investment Authority conduct a full Regulatory Impact Assessment on the effect of any proposed regime on remittance flows, FDI, banking-sector compliance costs, and Uganda's correspondent-banking relationships.

v. Benchmark Against the Right Peers

The drafting process expressly benchmark against the United States FARA (transparency model), the Kenya PBO Act (civil society model), and the OECD and FATF standards on AML/CFT, and not against the Russia/Georgia/Hungary foreign-agent model.

vi. Protected Categories

Any eventual law explicitly exempt from its operation: (a) personal and family remittances, (b) commercial transactions at arm's length, (c) religious, humanitarian, and medical assistance, (d) academic and scientific exchange, (e) diaspora investment, (f) refugee support, and (g) remittances and grants below a reasonable de minimis threshold.

vii. Proportionate Penalties and Due Process

Any offences be narrowly defined, require proof of willful conduct, carry proportionate penalties, and be subject to full judicial review including an independent appeals tribunal.

Conclusion

Sovereignty is not secured by walling off one's own citizens from one another. Uganda's sovereignty, understood as the Constitution understands it, as the power of the people of Uganda, is strengthened, not weakened, by the two-and-a-half billion dollars sent home each year by its daughters and sons abroad. It is strengthened by churches that build clinics, mosques that feed orphans, NGOs that defend the rights of the most vulnerable, and investors who see Uganda as open for business. It is strengthened by courts that can check executive power, by Parliament that deliberates openly, and by laws written with clarity, proportion, and respect for the citizen.

The Protection of Sovereignty Bill, 2026, as drafted, risks weakening each of these. It is not too late to change course. The tools to achieve every legitimate objective of the Bill already exist in Uganda's statute book, or can be adopted from peers who have solved the same problem without paying the diplomatic, economic, and constitutional costs the present Bill would impose.

We therefore respectfully urge the Government to withdraw the Bill, to convene a genuine consultation, and to return to Parliament with a narrower, transparency-based framework that reflects Uganda's actual interests and its constitutional character.

> ***Uganda's sovereignty belongs to the people. A law worthy of that sovereignty must serve the people, not register them, license them, or make criminals of them for the ordinary acts of family, faith, enterprise, and civic life.***

Sigmund M. Rugimbi
Legal Theorist and Constitutional Policy Analyst

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End of Position Paper