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You cannot Legislate Away The People’s Mandate.

Written by Dr. Sarah Bireete

The Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Bill, 2026, risks turning the opposition into a parliamentary arrangement rather than a political institution born out of the people’s electoral choices.

The Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Bill, 2026, sponsored by Hon. Denis Namara, raises a fundamental question about Uganda’s multiparty democracy: Who determines political leadership—the people through elections or MPs through parliamentary arithmetic after elections?

The Bill proposes transferring the election of the Leader of the Opposition (LoP) from the largest opposition party to a collective vote of opposition MPs. It also proposes changes to the constitution of the Shadow Cabinet and introduces a parliamentary mechanism for censuring the LoP.

These are not merely administrative reforms. They risk altering the relationship between electoral mandates, political parties and opposition leadership.

Article 1 of the Constitution is clear: all power belongs to the people. Elections are how citizens determine who should govern them and how. Political parties present manifestos, nominate candidates and compete for public support. The electorate then determines their political strength through the ballot.

Uganda operates a presidential system: the President obtains an executive mandate through direct election, while parliamentary elections determine the relative strength of political parties in Parliament. The largest opposition party therefore occupies a distinct political position arising from the choices of voters.

Why should MPs from smaller opposition parties collectively determine the leadership of the largest opposition party?

MPs exercise delegated authority from the people; they do not own the people’s mandate. An MP elected on one party’s ticket does not automatically acquire the authority to determine the leadership of another political organization simply because both parties sit on the opposition benches.

Being outside government does not make different political parties one organization. They have distinct constituencies, manifestos, ideologies and ambitions to govern.

There is a fundamental difference between a coalition and a collection of opposition parties. A coalition is negotiated. Parties voluntarily agree on common objectives, leadership arrangements and a shared program. It cannot be manufactured through legislation simply because several parties have failed to obtain the mandate to govern.

The same applies to the Shadow Cabinet. It is not another parliamentary committee. It is an alternative government in preparation: an institution that scrutinizes government, develops alternative policies and demonstrates readiness to assume executive responsibility when the necessary mandate is obtained.

Whose manifesto would a collectively controlled Shadow Cabinet implement? Who would be accountable for its performance? Where parties have not negotiated a coalition, why should Parliament impose a shared political program on them?

Political cooperation is voluntary; coalition is negotiated, not legislated into existence.

The constitutional implications are equally important. Articles 2, 29, 38 and 72 protect constitutional supremacy, freedom of association, citizens’ participation in government and the right to form and operate political parties. These guarantees must inform Parliament’s legislative authority under Article 82A, which establishes the Office of the Leader of the Opposition.

Parliament can regulate the office, but that power is not unlimited. Article 82A cannot be interpreted in isolation from the constitutional protections afforded to political organizations and their members.

The proposed vote of censure against the LoP raises another concern. If the governing parliamentary majority can determine the removal of the principal opposition leader, the institution responsible for scrutinizing that majority becomes vulnerable to its political influence. Accountability is necessary, but removal must be based on clearly defined grounds, objective evidence and due process.

An opposition cannot effectively hold government accountable if its leadership is vulnerable to the interests of the government it scrutinizes.

There are more democratic ways to promote inclusiveness: an Opposition Parties Consultative Forum, equitable committee representation and voluntary coalition arrangements. Smaller opposition parties deserve a voice, but participation must not become political control over another party’s leadership.

Ultimately, this Bill raises a question bigger than who occupies the office of Leader of the Opposition. It concerns whether Parliament can rearrange political mandates after citizens have exercised their sovereignty.

The governing party derives its political legitimacy from the electoral process. The opposition derives its political standing from the support it receives. A coalition derives its legitimacy from the agreement of its constituent parties. These are distinct sources of political authority.

Parliament should facilitate cooperation, not manufacture political alliances or redistribute electoral mandates.

The people’s mandate is not Parliament’s property. MPs are delegates, not owners, of the people’s political will. A Shadow Cabinet is an alternative government, not a parliamentary committee. And the opposition is not a coalition by default.

The people choose. Political parties organize. MPs exercise delegated authority. Parliament must respect that democratic order, not rewrite it.

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Executive Power Without Restraint: How the Collapse of the Rule of Law Is Re-shaping Governance in Uganda

The rule of law is the central pillar upon which constitutional governance rests. When it weakens, executive power ceases to be bounded by law and instead becomes governed by discretion, coercion, and fear. The steady erosion of the rule of law has fundamentally altered the character and exercise of executive authority, raising grave constitutional and moral questions.

Articles 98 and 99 of the Constitution vest executive authority in the President, designating him both Head of State and Government, and mandating Him to execute the laws of Uganda. This authority, however, is not absolute. It is explicitly constrained by the Constitution itself; reinforced by the presidential oath, which requires the President to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and to govern according to the law.

Executive power is therefore fiduciary in nature, held in trust for the people, not exercised above them. When state actions routinely violate constitutional guarantees, the executive ceases to be a constitutional custodian and instead becomes a source of constitutional injury.

One of the clearest manifestations of the collapse of the rule of law is the routine use of excessive force by the police. Public order management has increasingly been characterised by violent dispersals, arbitrary arrests, and disproportionate use of lethal and non-lethal force against civilians. The police, constitutionally mandated to protect life and property, have in many instances become an instrument of intimidation. When law enforcement acts with impunity, executive power shifts from lawful authority to raw coercion, undermining public trust and eroding legitimacy of the state itself.

Since 2020, we’ve witnessed a disturbing rise in abductions, often carried out by armed men in unmarked vehicles, with victims held incommunicado for days or weeks. Families are left without information, courts are bypassed, and legal safeguards are rendered meaningless. These abductions signal a profound breakdown of constitutional order. Executive power, when exercised outside the legal framework, becomes clandestine and unaccountable. Absence of transparency is not incidental; it is the very mechanism through which unlawful power sustains itself.

The Constitution guarantees the right to liberty and the right to be produced before a court within prescribed timelines. Yet prolonged detention without trial has become increasingly common, especially in politically sensitive cases. Detention without trial is not merely a procedural violation; it is an assertion that executive convenience outweighs constitutional rights. It converts justice system into an accessory rather than a check on power, hollowing out the separation of powers that underpins democratic governance.

Perhaps the gravest indictment of executive overreach is the continued use of torture. The prohibition against torture is absolute, non-derogable under both the Ugandan Constitution and international human rights law. No emergency, no political objective, and no security justification can excuse it. When torture occurs, it represents the complete abandonment of lawful governance. It signals that the executive has stepped outside the moral and legal boundaries of the Constitution, replacing law with cruelty as a tool of control.

The convergence of police brutality, abductions, unlawful detentions, and torture points to a deeper constitutional crisis; one in which executive authority increasingly operates without restraint. A state that governs through fear rather than law may command obedience, but it forfeits legitimacy. Restoring the rule of law is therefore not an abstract legal demand; it is a constitutional necessity to reclaim executive power as an instrument of service rather than domination.

Without the rule of law, executive power does not strengthen the state, it corrodes it from within.

Email: sarah.bireete@gmail.com 

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